In their search to maintain control, Russians would quickly discover that they are in possession of economically unviable provinces that cannot survive without massive infusions of rubles. According to a detailed Ukrainian studyof how much Ukraine’s provinces paid into and received from the central budget in the first half of 2013, Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhya represented an enormous drain on Kyiv’s resources: 22.82 billion hryvnia (around $2.5 billion, or 90 billion rubles). And that is only for the first six months of the year. Multiplied by two, the deficit amounts to 45.64 billion hryvnia (about $5 billion, or 180 billion rubles).
In 2014, Russia expects its budget revenues to be around 13.6 trillion rubles (around $375 billion); its expenditures are supposed to total 14 trillion rubles ($380 billion). That amounts to a deficit of 400 billion rubles ($11 billion). Even without extra development funds or the costs of an occupation, annexing Ukraine’s southeast will raise Russia’s deficit by 45 percent.
The bad news gets worse for Russia. Luhansk and Donetsk provinces are home to Ukraine’s loss-making coal industry. Kyiv spends between 12 and 14 billion hryvnia(around $1 billion–$1.5 billion, or 47 billion–55 billion rubles) annually to support these mines. Will Russia back these enterprises even as they compete with more economically produced coal from Russia’s Kuzbass? It will have to: As Kyiv knows from experience, firing thousands of coal miners could spark massive civil unrest. Moscow will also have to pay them their wages on time. In 2013, wage arrears reached a total of 135 million hryvnia (about $15 million, or 530 million rubles) in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR
Russian nationalist groups signed a broad declaration on March 1st, stating their their intention to ‘defend the rights of Russians in Ukraine’ at a meeting held by the Russian deputy prime minister. Historian and Ukrainian politician Hryhoriy Nemyria separately claimed that Moscow has “Russian citizens in Ukraine’s provinces orchestrating illegal seizure of administration buildings,” and that Russian citizens were working in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Mykolayiv.
In eastern regions of Ukraine pro-Russian protesters have stormed the Donetsk and Mariupol government administrations, and in the former, pulling down the flag of Ukraine. Donetsk city council declared itself the soul authority of the region, distancing itself from the government in Kyiv and declaring Russian the official language. Russian rallies in Odessa were also reported, with up to 5,000 attending, promoting Soviet symbols.
In Kharkiv, Russian demonstrators violently stormed the RSA, evicting Euromaidan protesters; 97 were reported injured in the attack, including minors, and 2 from gunshots (note that Euromaidan protesters previously occupying the building did so peacefully once security stood down). Journalist Serhiy Zhadan was also attacked in the clashes. BBC reports that the pro-Russian protesters also clashed with local police.
During the clashes in Kharkiv, it was discovered that the man who planted the Russian flag atop the State Administration was a Russian citizen from Moscow. The man was determined to be popular Russian activist Mika Ronkainen .On his blog, he stated “I am proud that I was able to participate in the confrontation with militants who came “to peacefully protest” in Kharkiv, and hoist the Russian flag on the liberated administration!” The flag was later removed, said regional officials.
The rally in Donetsk, which discussed the possibility of secession, chose Pavel Gubarev to be the commander of the “People’s Militia of Donbass,” who called for the annexation of the entire Donbass (Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk) region to Russia. The protesters were in direct defiance to the incumbent governor, an appointee of the largely pro-Russian Yanukovych regime. Police stated they would side with the people, presumably the secessionist crowds (as opposed to the contingent of the population loyal to the Party of Regions). The demonstrations in Donetsk ended abruptly, implying that participants may have been paid as was often seen with pro-regime protests during Euromaidan. While they continued on the second day, crowds reached a maximum of only 1,000 attendees.
The Kyiv Postreported that a petition by ethnic Russians has already garnered over 50,000 signatures, asking Russia to not intervene and that there is no persecution of Russians in Ukraine.
Previously, pro-Russian or rallies of any kind in the east and south have been limited even during the peak of the Euromaidan protest movement. The presence of Russian citizens engaging in the protests is a concerning development.
In the eastern city of Dnipropetrovsk thousands took to the streets on Saturday evening in an anti-Putin march. Near the Regional State Administration, they chanted “Putin = Hitler” and “East & West Together.” The regional leader of Right Sector announced a general mobilization of the male population, and calling all with hunting weapons to arm themselves to protect the peace. The RSA was staffed with self-defense squads in case of an attack as in Kharkiv, and remained barricaded with barbed wire, a remnant of the former Yanukovych-installed governor.
An eastern solution?
One solution to the regional fissures in Ukraine may be to employ the nation’s oligarchs, and include them in the decision making process of their home regions, tying them and the wellbeing of their businesses to local stability. Former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko said that negotiations were ongoing with large businesses in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine and that the goal is to use not only public but also private resources to maintain regional unity. Donetsk-base oligarch Serhiy Taruta was appointed to govern the region, and Israeli-Ukrainian businessman Igor Kolomoisky was made head of his local Dnipropetrovsk. Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk are also considering taking governing posts.
The Ukrainian government also proposed today to include more eastern Ukrainian politicians within in the new Ukrainian government in Kyiv, hoping to provide greater legitimacy in eastern regions that may feel dejected over the loss of the revolution against the Yanukovych regime.
This article will update as the situation unfolds.
Viktor Yanukovych is a wanted man. Today Ukraine’s acting Interior Ministry announced the deposed president, along with roughly 50 other top officials of the collapsed regime, were being placed under criminal investigation with Yanukovych placed on the nation’s Most Wanted list. While he still seems to have symbolic, if not fading backing from Russia, Yanukovych’s support base has fallen through the floor among all but his closest associates. Even his own Party of Regions has denounced him as a criminal and murderer. But where did he go? Where is the sultan turned vagabond?
Shortly after it was announced that impeachment proceedings would be taken against him, Yanukovych fled the capital along with cohort Andriy Klyuyev. Rumors swirled over whether he had gone to Kharkiv, to attend the separatist Ukrainian Front conference, or Dubai. The latter, we now know, was a decoy; those following on the Twittersphere were quick to track his alleged flight information in an attempt to pin down. Yanukovych instead flew by helicopter to Kharkiv to avoid detection.
Tenant Prime Minister Turchynov claimed Yanukovych had agreed to resign as president, but after consulting with advisers, he disavowed the decision and submitted a pre-recorded tape claiming his right to rule. Yanukovych said he would not resign or leave the country, and called decisions by parliament “illegal” and that “The events witnessed by our country and the whole world are an example of a coup d’etat,” comparing it to the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany in the 1930s – a common line of rhetoric among Russian officials to shore up post-war sensitivities in the post-Soviet republic.
Following the parliamentary procedures to transfer power to the new provisional government, Attorney General Pshonka and Taxation Minister Klymenko were stopped at the Russian border while trying to flee the country. Yanukovych then flew from Kharkiv to Donetsk aboard his helicopter, where he then, according to the State Border Service, tried to flee via a charter flight on one of two Dassault Falcon jets in Donetsk, but was stopped by border guards. The border agents were “met by a group of armed men who offered money for flying without the proper clearance”. Yanukovych then left by armored car, and spent a few hours at a state residence in the city – sources indicate he was abetted by Rinat Akhmetov. Former Interior Minister Vitaly Zakharchenko (who we now know gave the official order to fire on protesters) also attempted to fly out of Donetsk and was denied access for similar reasons.
Yanukovych’s motorcade then left for Crimea, leaving state traffic police who protected him behind. The next day, February 23rd, he visited a private resort while intentionally avoiding state or known residences to avoid detection. Rada reputy Oleh Lyashkoclaimed Yanukovych was seen at the Russian Naval base in Sevastopol where he was preparing to flee via Russian military vessel (this was reciprocated in media reports on the 24th). Ukrainian MiG fighter jets were scrambled during the search and it’s said at this time he was abetted by deposed defense minister Pavlo Lebedev.
Authorities attempted to intercept Yanukovych’s motorcade at the international airport in Sevastopol, but one step ahead, he never arrived. Authorities then lost his trail finally on February 24th near his family’s Crimean residence in the the former city of Balaklava, where he released those in his presidential secret service from duty who wished to stand down. The released guards then collected the weapons that officially belong to the government so they could be handed over to the authorities.
Oleksandr Yanukovych restored a series of historical waterfront homes and leased land for a private yacht club in this very area, which remains a possible site of hiding. Journalist Tetyana Chornovol meanwhile speculated that instead he was likely to flee by sea aboard his son’s private yacht, suitably christened “Bandit,” but local reports indicated the yacht hasn’t been seen in some time and GPS data confirms it’s last known location to be far away.
Following parting ways with a portion of his security staff, he, along with his most loyal guards, narrowed the motorcade down to 3 vehicles and left, turning off all communication devices. Reports conflicted as to the whereabouts of Klyuyev: according to acting Interior Minister Avakov, he remained with the president; according to Klyuev’s spokesman Artyom Petrenko, he tendered his resignation to the president in Crimea on the 23rd, saying he “couldn’t stop Yanukovych.” He was then allegedly shot and wounded, with media stating the shootout occurred on his trip back to Kyiv. Petrenko claims Klyuyev is currently in an unspecified Kyiv hospital.
On Wednesday, Klyuyev issued a statement through his press office, distancing himself from Yanukovych, denying his involvement in the Kyiv killings, and stating his intent to cooperate with authorities.
The trail in Crimea had appeared to run officially cold on the 26th, with Interior Minister Avakov admitting that the search was pulled back in Sevastopol to avoid possible armed conflicts in the troubled city. “I think we must not allow any military standoff or conflict to happen. I shall be extremely candid with you: it was one of the reasons why on the night when Valentyn Nalyvaichenko (the head of the Ukrainian Security Council) and I were in Sevastopol, in Crimea, we chose not to continue tough actions with respect of Viktor Yanukovych… Because at that moment we knew it was essentially an affront for armed conflict with grounds for [Russian] forces to interfere in this conflict… We made the decision that the future of Crimea is more important for us than the situation with Yanukovych,”he told a press conference on Wednesday.
The manhunt was escalated to an international search as reports surfaced that Yanu had successfully made he was through the Kerch Strait along with his son Viktor Jr. and into Russian protection. Multiplesources, stated to be confirmed by high-placed Russian officials and law enforcement, alleged that the night prior he had arrived in Moscow, and was seen at the Radisson Royal (confirmed by hotel management). There, he apparently spent all night until Wednesday morning on the 11th floor at a private club restaurant under heightened private security; fugitive former General Prosecutor Pshonka is believed to be with him and his other son, Oleksandr, is reported to have reunited the family.
He is now presumed to be in the Moscow suburb of Barvikha. An RBC report indicated that a house in Barvikha was purchased by a group of Ukrainian citizens for $52 million, and that the house is now under guard. “Yesterday Ukrainian citizens came with passports and without bargaining, bought it, said Russian politician Oleg Mitvol. Previous sources to RBC had indicated Yanukovych was stationed at a local resort.
Head of the Russian Foreign Affairs Committee Mikhail Margelov denied the rumors, saying that Russia wouldn’t risk giving him asylum. Later, the official newspaper of Russian president Vladimir Putin, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, [humorously] alleged that the CIA had whisked Yanukovych Stateside after offering him and his family personal guarantees of safety should he step away from the political arena. The paper followed by refuting Yanukovych’s asylum by the Russian Navy in Cossack Bay, Sevastopol, ‘Yanukovych is not in the facilities or ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet,’ citing an ‘informed military source’. Ultimately, the Russian Border Service neither confirmed nor denied the earlier reports on Yanukovych’s entering the country.
On February 27 Yanukovych resurfaced, sending a message to Ukraine declaring himself still the legitimate president of the country. In his address, he stated he was “forced to ask the authorities of the Russian Federation to ensure [his] personal safety from the actions of extremists.” A government source confirmed that Yanukovych’s request has been granted “on the territory of the Russian Federation.” Later, newly elected head of Crimea’s parliament, Sergei Aksenov of the fringe Russian Unity party said that he recognized Yanukovych as the true president of Ukraine and that he would obey his orders – and presumably provide him save haven should he return to Ukraine. Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky told reporters he was glad the Russian government has provided Yanukovych with security personnel.
In the evening, Yanukovych arrived in Russia’s Rostov-on-Don via airplane at 10pm local time to hold a news conference in Rostov-on-Don at 5pm on Friday February 28. In it he claimed he would return to Ukraine only if given security guarantees, and credited ‘patriotic officers’ with enabling him to escape Ukraine into Russia. “It was thanks to patriotic officers that I was able to get to Russia. Let me put it this way: officers who did their duty and helped me stay alive,” Yanukovych told reporters at the conference.
This story will update as new information becomes available. Last updated 2/28 at 10:45 am EST
Alexander Motyl explains why threats of secessionism in Ukraine are a bluff which would only negatively impact the Donbas regime as well as Russia, and how Ukraine’s divisions are no different than any modern state:
Has any country ever been “one” country—especially twenty-odd years after its establishment? The United States was a loose agglomeration of former colonies—and, oh, yes, there was that slavery thing between the North and the South. Canada? Ditto. Otto von Bismarck’s Germany? Mazzini’s Italy? Ditto, ditto. And how about Russia? It’s always been a multinational empire marked by enormous regional, ethnic, and confessional diversity
Personally, I have no doubt that Ukraine without its southeast would be much stronger, more stable, and more prosperous than Ukraine with its southeast. The southeast’s rust-belt economy needs either to be shut down entirely or to be refitted at the cost of trillions of dollars of non-existent investments. Moreover, the statistics plainly show that Kyiv subsidizes the Donbas, and not vice versa. The southeast also has a low birth rate, a high death rate, low life expectancy, high energy consumption, and high AIDS and crime rates. Last but not least, the southeast is home to the ruling Party of Regions and the Communist Party. Remove the southeast and Ukraine’s treasury experiences an immediate boon; its demographics, energy consumption, and health improve; and its politics automatically become more democratic and less corrupt.